Russia decisively defeated the Ottoman empire in 1828-29 and
the victory caused the Russians to revise their policy towards
the Ottomans which heretofore had been very aggressive. The war
opened up for the first time the possibility of a complete collapse
of the Ottoman empire. Mohammed Ali, the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt,
was practically independent and almost as powerful as the Sultan
himself. The Russian victory in 1829 convinced him that he either
had to break away from the empire or be destroyed along with it.
If he succeeded in that, the Ottoman empire would cease to exist
and all Europe was fearful of the struggle that would ensue for
the remains. 2 In
1829 the Tsar decided that the dissolution of the Ottoman empire
would be more dangerous to Russia than its continued existence
and the disadvantages of such an event would far outweigh the
benefits of any possible territorial gains. Russia would rather
have a weak state that recognized its supremacy than to have it
replaced by other, perhaps stronger or more dangerous powers.
Russia therefore in 1829 committed itself to the maintenance of
the Ottoman empire. 3
Russia's relationship with Persia was similar. The Persians
had been defeated twice and they now recognized the supremacy
of the Tsar and his claim to the Caucasus. Russia on its part
realized that further aggression against Persia would cause the
total collapse of Kajar rule and therefore was satisfied with
the situation. The Murid revolt in the Caucasus showed that the
tribal anarchy that would likely ensue would be much harder to
deal with. Beginning in the 1820's a religious brother-hood, the
Murids, led an anti-Russian crusade in the higher mountains. Russian
efforts to crush the movement only increased its strength, and
excellent leadership welded the tribes into an effective fighting
force. Although the Murid revolt was confined to the mountain
tribes, it constantly threatened Russian communications through
the Caucasus and made the strategic situation vis a vis Persia
and Turkey very precarious. 4
East of the Caspian Sea Russia faced the nomad Kazakhs. At
times united and powerful, the Kazakhs had more often been divided
into the Great, Middle, and Lesser Hordes. Serious defeats at
the hands of the Kalmuk Mongols in the mid-eighteenth century
led the Middle and Lesser Hordes to seek Russian protection. Control
of the roving tribes was difficult however, and the Russians built
a line of forts to protect their Siberian settlements from raids.
The tribal leaders made a formal submission in 1822 but the tribesmen
still evaded control. The insecurity of Russian rule and the resulting
instability were problems which were solved only after years of
minor but constant warfare, in which the Kazakhs were often supported
by the Uzbeg Khanates to the south. 5
The wars of the 1820's established for Russia a position of
predominance in Western Asia. Russia decisively defeated the Ottoman
and Persian empires and made them acknowledge Russian supremacy,
the Kazakhs had submitted, and only the Uzbeg and Afghan states
and the Arabian deserts remained untouched by the Tsar's power.
Russia had every reason to be satisfied with this situation but
it was not to go unchallenged. The Russian position and the British
challenge to it that developed during the 1830's were the conditions
that made Mohammed Shah's march on Herat in 1837 an event of more
than purely local importance.
The British East India Company, from small beginnings at trading
stations along the coast in the seventeenth century, had come
to dominate the entire Indian subcontinent. Because of poor communications
links, the real rulers of India were the Governors-General and
the bureaucracy that had grown up in India itself. The Governors-General
were carefully selected and they cooperated closely with their
colleagues in the British Government, but in the early nineteenth
century, British policy in Western Asia was for the most part
determined by the political and strategic needs of the Indian
empire. 6
Like all great empires, British India was concerned with order,
stability, and undisputed domination. It tolerated minor states
on the frontiers or within India only if they recognized British
supremacy. Yet whereas the Russians could not conceive of an alternative
to their empire, and attempted to integrate all their dominions
and convince their subjects of the principle of Autocracy, the
British always doubted their ability to resist challenges in India,
and they made little attempt to unify their possessions or provide
an ideology for their rule. They lacked a sense of their imperial
mission and their empire was insecure as a result. 7
Along with empire in India came the need to protect the frontiers.
Historically most invaders of India have come by way of the passes
in the northwest. Some like the Moguls founded great empires,
others like the Afghans had little lasting impact. Nevertheless
the image of armies pouring out of the Khyber pass was well established.
It was the activity of Zaman Shah and the schemes of Napoleon
that first fixed British attentions on the Northwest. 8
Considering Napoleon's accomplishments by 1806, it seemed plausible
that he could arouse the nations of Iran and Central Asia and
lead them to India. The participation of Russia in these plans
only made the danger more real. The British response to this threat
was to set up several buffer states in the northwest to absorb
the shock and perhaps block an invasion. In 1808 and 1809, at
the height of the French threat, embassies were sent to Afghanistan,
Persia, Sind, and the Sikhs to secure treaties of alliance against
Napoleon. 9
The French threat was ephemeral and soon faded away but the
buffer policy remained. The Sikh state of Ranjit Singh became
the anchor of British policy in the northwest. Beginning in 1799,
Ranjit Singh had put together a compact state out of the many
Sikh clans that had dominated the Punjab after the death of Ahmad
Shah in 1773. Ranjit Singh's treaty with the British in 1809 prevented
him from expanding eastward and uniting all the Sikhs, but gave
him a free hand in the west. The strength of the Sikh state was
its army, which was the most effective force in India outside
of the British. But he did not build an administration that could
function without his personal supervision and that was his greatest
weakness, placing all his other achievements in jeopardy. 10
The Sikh state was a good buffer, effectively shielding India
from the disorders in Afghanistan, but Ranjit Singh's westward
expansion caused other problems for the British. After the collapse
of Afghanistan in 1818, the Sikhs annexed the provinces along
the Indus river one by one. In 1823 Ranjit forced Peshawar to
pay him tribute. 11
The involvement of the Sikhs added a new dimension to the already
complicated Afghan scene. British attempts to preserve peace on
the Northwest between the Sikhs and their neighbors eventually
drew the British into war in Afghanistan.
Important as India was however, other matters also figured in British considerations. The balance of power in Europe was the most important but the economy was also beginning to command some attention. The industrial revolution was just beginning to take hold and trade was essential to keep the industrial machine going. Great quantities of food and raw materials were needed and Britain in the early nineteenth century was the world's greatest market, buying about one third of all other countries exports. It was considered the duty of the Government to keep the sea lanes open and to ensure dependable supplies and markets. 12 As time went on the economy assumed more and more importance in determining British policy around the world but during the 1830's political and military considerations came first.