In June 1836 the Shah announced his intention to march against
Khiva and Herat. In this he was overly ambitious. There was cholera
in Khorasan which precluded any operations in that direction.
The Persian army then marched against the Goklan and Yomut Turkmen
but it could not come to grips with them. Desultory warfare went
on for several months and by November the army had fallen back
to Astrabad, still skirmishing with the Turkmen. At Astrabad food
was short, pay was in arrears, and morale was very low. The campaign
was a dismal failure. 1
The contrast between this operation and the wars of Abbas Mirza
four years earlier, in the same area, with the same army, against
the same enemy, seems to indicate that the greatest failure was
that of leadership.
The British Minister had done his best to discourage Mohammed
Shah from marching east in 1836, but he had to contend not only
with the Shah1s determination but also with the activities of
the Russians. There was a change in Russian policy in Persia that
apparently coincided with the arrival of the new Minister, Count
Ivan Simonich, in 1835. In 1834 the Russians had cooperated with
the British in Persia, but in 1836 Simonich was actively promoting
the campaign in direct opposition to British policy. More than
that, Simonich promised Russian aid and possibly helped the Persians
with their financial preparations. 2
The question arises as to why the Russians were doing this.
The British were sure that it was for the purpose of subverting
their rule in India. They always assumed that a Persian Herat
would become a center of Russian influence, which would then spread
to the borders of India, and they feared the effects of this on
the internal peace of India. The more extreme Russophobes thought
that the march on Herat would be the first step in the anticipated
Russian invasion of India. 3
However the Russian motives were perhaps not so sinister. It may
be assumed that they knew about British opposition to the Persian
plans for Herat. Knowing this, they could see that if the Shah
carried out his plans, the dispute could lead to a complete alienation
between Britain and Persia. The British gains of the last few
years would then be nullified and Russia’s earlier position
of primacy in Persia would be restored. This could possibly be
accomplished by merely encouraging the Persians to do what they
had already decided to do and at no risk to Russia.
Late in 1836 a new British Minister, Sir John McNeill, arrived
in Persia. His mission was to restrain Persia from attacking Herat
and also negotiate a new treaty. The 1811 treaty had become embarrassing,
especially the clause that pledged Britain not to interfere in
a Persian-Afghan war. 4
But McNieill was in an impossible position. Mohammed Shah was
not inclined to favor the British in spite of the aid provided
him in securing the throne. In the first place the British had
refused to aid Persia during the Russian war in spite of treaty
obligations to do so. Then they had taken advantage of Persia's
desperate position to get out of the obligations altogether. Now,
in violation of another article of the treaty, they objected to
the Persian conquest of Herat, a project that the Shah saw not
only as a legitimate national goal but also as a matter of personal
honor. Simonich's task was made easy.
After the unproductive campaign against the Turkmen, Mohammed
Shah dispersed his troops with orders to muster again the following
spring. During that time McNeill worked hard to arrange a diplomatic
settlement. The Persians were agonizingly slow getting started
in 1837, and in June McNeill was able to obtain an agreement from
Herat to cease all hostile acts against Persia and resume payment
of tribute. But Yar Mohammed would not admit Persian sovereignty,
and even if he had the Shah would not have accepted it. Herat
had agreed to all this before and never kept its promises. McNeill
was only wasting his time. 5
Yar Mohammed was definitely not wasting his time in these last few months. While the Persian army was dispersed he kept strengthening Herat’s defenses and cementing his ties with the surrounding tribes. He also worked to consolidate his hold on Seistan. 6 Kohendil Khan in Kandahar was exceedingly alarmed by these moves. He wrote to the Persian governor of Khorasan urging him to strike at Herat while Yar Mohammed was fighting in Seistan. 7 While this brought no response from the Persians, the British took note of it and it greatly increased their worries.